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 The competition effects of privatization  
make private provision more efficient than 
public provision.
 Outsourcing public services can lower costs 
(for example, in the UK with urban public 
transportation) and increase consumer choice, 
(Sweden’s school vouchers).
 Competition in service provision stimulates 
innovation, for example in the quality of 
education and more efficient use of resources.
ELEvator PItCH
Outsourcing public provision of services tends to lower 
labor intensity and increase its efficiency. Costs are 
usually lower, but quality problems can affect services 
like health care and residential youth care. Consumer 
choice has stimulated innovation in education, but 
the picture is ambiguous for health care. Natural 
monopolies are unsuitable for outsourcing. Network 
services (public transportation) may be outsourced 
through public tenders. While some jobs may be lost 
in the short run, the long-term effects are generally 
positive for a wide variety of activities.
autHor’S MaIn MESSaGE
It is impossible to give uniform policy advice on outsourcing the provision of public services to the private sector. 
Whether that is desirable depends on the characteristics of the service and on market conditions. Voucher systems 
can increase service quality and decrease costs. Natural monopolies are not suitable for outsourcing. Municipalities 
should be allowed to make their own decisions based on their needs and the degree of political support.
Cons
 Private-sector cost minimization efforts risk 
worsening the quality of public services, 
depending on the type of service outsourced.
 Some public-sector employees may lose their 
jobs.
 Natural monopolies (water supply, the 
electricity grid) cannot be privatized without 
risking a hold-up problem or corruption.
Public-sector outsourcing
The desirability of outsourcing the provision of public services 
depends on their characteristics and market conditions
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A growing number of governments are outsourcing the provision of public goods and 
services, whether through procurement contracts or voucher systems (see outsourcing 
and privatization). Outsourcing has repercussions for consumers and for employees 
in affected sectors, and for the labor unions representing them. Not all activities are 
suitable for outsourcing.
outsourcing and privatization
Public-sector outsourcing is distinct from privatization. Outsourcing, broadly defined, 
entails the private-sector provision of public goods or services under procurement 
contracts or vouchers that offer consumers of public services a choice of private-
sector providers. Privatization entails the sale or other transfer of ownership of a 



















































Figure 1. In-kind social transfers purchased by governments from private providers have
risen since 1995
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Production costs in general government.”
In: Government at a Glance 2009. OECD Publishing, 2009; p. 63 [2].
In Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK outsourced production accounts 
for more than 50% of the total costs of publicly provided goods and services, and the 
average share in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries was slightly above 40% in 2007. There is great variety across OECD countries 
in the share of gross domestic product (GDP) of in-kind social transfers purchased 
from private providers; these shares have not decreased for any of these countries 
since 1995 and have grown strongly for several countries (see Figure 1). While there 
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have been only moderate increases in the outsourcing of health care and public 
transport, there have been larger increases in outsourcing electricity distribution and 
postal services.
DISCuSSIon oF ProS anD ConS
The general argument is that outsourcing and opening public sectors like health 
care and education to competition boost economic efficiency and output. There 
is a concern, however, that outsourcing could lower service quality. A survey of the 
literature concludes that the effects of public-sector outsourcing on service quality 
depend on the type of service outsourced [3].
Outsourcing generally reduces costs without hurting quality for services that are easy 
to standardize, like garbage collection. The same appears to hold, for the most part, 
for fire protection and prisons, although the picture is mixed. In contrast, public-
sector outsourcing can result in quality deterioration for goods such as residential 
youth care and other credence goods, because their utility is difficult or impossible 
for consumers to ascertain. Empirical evidence suggests that not only does quality 
decline but also that the costs of the service increase with outsourcing.
The modeling of local government choice between public provision and outsourcing 
indicates that private provision is unambiguously better than public provision when 
the cost reduction results in moderate to no quality deterioration, as in garbage 
collection [4]. The model predicts that outsourcing unambiguously leads to lower 
costs, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. If the negative impact of cost reduction 
on quality is fairly large, public provision is preferable. When used with data from the 
US, this model indicates that services that are more difficult to contract out are more 
likely to be kept within the public sector. Where large transfers of power are involved, 
as with the army and police force, provision should remain in-house. Sectors like 
health care, where information asymmetries are important, cannot be treated with 
the simple model, but require a more complex framework.
Labor unions and the impact on employment
Public-sector outsourcing is controversial, in part because of its impact on employment. 
Public hiring is often used to reduce unemployment. The most politicized argument 
concerning outsourcing is the fear of the loss of public-sector jobs. However, the 
empirical evidence for this fear is ambiguous. Most studies that focus on developing 
and transition economies have concluded that the long-term effect on employment is 
either imperceptible or positive, although there might be short-term job losses from 
outsourcing or privatizing public services and enterprises, which are often overstaffed 
(particularly in transition economies). Reducing employment in industries with excess 
labor frees resources for more productive work. Also, as economic efficiency increases 
following privatization, more jobs tend to be created than are lost in the initial switch 
to private provision. Less is known about the employment effects in developed 
countries, although the research also points to similar outcomes.
Still, public employee unions often strongly oppose outsourcing. Where public-sector 
unionization is high and the employment level is held constant, collective bargaining 
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will lead to higher wages, making public employment more expensive. Taking wages 
as constant, high unionization also implies more power for unions and therefore more 
bargaining strength against outsourcing. Outsourcing can be a means to curb the 
power of public-sector unions if it leads to lower union membership. However, how 
that happens is important. If membership is simply transferred from one union to 
another, what happens to the overall power of unions is unclear, even if the union 
that loses members also loses power. If the members instead move to a non-union 
employer, overall union membership declines and, with it, the bargaining power of 
the unions.
Labor intensity is much lower in privatized activities than in public provision, where 
redistributive goals may be more important than profit maximization. Additional 
public-sector inefficiencies stem from a lack of residual control rights. A growing 
body of literature recommends a “new public management” approach, whose goal is 
to organize public-sector institutions more like private businesses in their structure, 
management, and accounting.
Empirical analysis finds that privately owned firms are decisively more productive 
than publicly run firms, have lower labor intensity, and use less leverage [5]. However, 
the privatization itself cannot be identified as the main factor behind the productivity 
advantage. Rather, government-run companies are restructured before privatization, 
which makes them more productive.
It has been argued that an in-built inefficiency in the public sector and distortions 
in taxation make government ownership relatively cheaper than privatization if the 
sector’s inefficiency is relatively small compared with its size and if the efficiency costs 
of taxation are high. Others have claimed that the range of activities that are carried 
out by the state is larger the higher the budgetary need for distortionary taxation.
Another study suggests a different explanation for higher labor intensity in the public 
sector than in outsourced production, based on the fact that, in most countries, labor 
is taxed more heavily than capital [6]. If public-sector units benefit from preferential 
treatment of civil servants in the collection of social security contributions, it can be 
optimal to use more labor and less capital in public production.
Similarly, a local government that taxes wage income receives part of the wages that 
it pays back as tax revenue. While private companies would use gross factor costs in 
their cost minimization problem, government units would deduct from these the part 
of the tax revenues that they implicitly receive back. Therefore, how tax revenue is 
allocated between lower and higher levels of government would affect optimal labor 
intensity from the perspective of lower-level governments.
Thus, higher labor intensity in public production is not necessarily undesirable. While 
different marginal rates of technical substitution in public and private production 
distort production efficiency with given factor supplies, higher labor intensity in the 
public sector may serve as a countervailing distortion to distorting wage taxation. 
When labor supply has a positive but low elasticity, it is optimal for labor intensity to 
be slightly higher in the public sector than in the private sector.
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A popular example of public-sector outsourcing is education. The empirical evidence 
on public-sector outsourcing of education services is quite positive: competition can 
lead to higher-quality education and more efficient use of resources. This finding has 
been demonstrated in diverse settings. The effects of private provision of schooling 
on educational outcomes have been studied for Chile, for the creation of autonomous 
grant-maintained schools in the UK, and for the effect of private-school competition 
on public-sector schools in Milwaukee in the US. Metropolitan areas with more choice 
among public schools have been found to have more productive public schools, which 
reduces demand for private schooling.
A voucher system introduced in Sweden in 1992 paid the entire cost of attending 
private or “independent” schools (friskolor), thus introducing competition into school 
choice. To minimize the possibility of adverse effects on public-sector schools, 
student selection could not be based on ability or socio-economic background, but 
only on such factors as proximity to the school and position on a waiting list. Before 
the reform, just 1% of children attended private schools; by 2012, 25.6% of students 
attended private or independent secondary schools, and 12.6% attended private or 
independent primary schools [7].
In line with previous studies, analysis shows that the increase in the share of 
independent schools led to an increase in educational achievement at the end of 
compulsory schooling and raised the probability of students going to university [7]. 
Several robustness checks made possible by the richness of the data confirm that 
there are no confounding effects of differential grade inflation and no omitted 
variables, such as a correlation between characteristics of a certain municipality and 
the probability of having a higher or lower share of independent schools.
Increased competition might lead to cost minimization, but it could also increase 
the costs per student for schools losing students. However, the productivity analysis 
showed no evidence of increased costs per student, indicating that the positive effect 
of the reform on performance came from the increased productivity induced by 
competition.
Health services outsourcing
The health sector picture is more complicated. There has been a steady increase 
in employment in the private health sector, along with an increase in privately run 
hospitals. In 2006, the share of full-time hospital employees working in the private 
sector was 13% in Germany, 18% in Australia, and 8% in Sweden. Thus, despite the 
increase, health care is still predominantly provided publicly.
Health care is a sensitive area of public procurement. Outsourcing to private 
institutions could lead to the exclusion of the sickest individuals in an effort to reduce 
costs. Outsourcing of health services also has to be treated with caution because it is 
a rare case of public competition, rather than public monopoly or private competition 
[3]. Even though the payoffs to innovation are small when competition is between 
public entities, the case for public competition is strengthened by the power that users 
have to choose a hospital, and the fact that each hospital can feasibly be seen as an 
independent unit. The effect on costs and quality of such public competition, though 
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differing from private competition, can be studied in this setting. The estimation 
results are mixed and differ for different aspects of health care, but there are some 
clear indications of quality improvement.
The UK introduced pro-competition reforms in the 1990s and 2000s. In the 1990s, 
selective contracting was introduced between public-sector buyers of secondary health 
care and hospitals. Contracts were negotiated based on price, volume, and quality. 
Analysis of the reforms, though weakened by the short duration of the reforms and 
the lack of adequate data, found that while the costs of care and waiting times fell 
in those areas with more competition, the overall effects of the internal market on 
the unobserved quality of care were negative. Long waiting times were a prominent 
complaint and could have shifted attention from less observable indicators of health 
care quality.
The UK reform in the 2000s focused on giving patients more choice, and price 
regulation replaced selective contracting. Hospitals received fixed prices for each type 
of treatment, and patients could choose from among five hospitals. The introduction 
of patient choice triggered a change in the choice of hospitals, with patients choosing 
higher-quality hospitals as measured by the mortality rate for heart-attack patients 
[8]. Hospitals facing more competition due to lower market concentration showed an 
increase in quality after the reform without an increase in cost. Finally, the reforms have 
not worsened—and might have even improved—the status of the socio-economically 
disadvantaged.
Health care and education services make an interesting comparison. Adverse selection 
is particularly strong in the health sector, and information asymmetries are arguably 
higher in the health sector than in education. While there is scope for adverse selection 
in education—weaker students could find it harder to get into good schools—the 
problem seems to be larger in the health sector. The success of initiatives such as 
Sweden’s education voucher program suggests that similar reforms could be tested in 
health care.
natural monopolies and the case of water provision
Another concern is whether public-sector outsourcing would simply replace a public 
monopoly with a private one in sectors that are “natural monopolies”—sectors where 
the presence of more than one firm is not cost-efficient. In the case of a natural 
monopoly, the scope for outsourcing is undermined by the possibility of a hold-up 
problem or corruption. An unregulated private monopoly firm can easily continue to 
Hold-up problem
Hold-up refers to a problem that can arise when two agents know that they would 
need to make relationship-specific investments to reap gains from future transactions. 
However, they cannot commit to the terms of the future transaction in advance or 
make a binding contract on relationship-specific investment. Consequently, either 
agent may refrain from making relationship-specific investments out of concern that 
doing so would weaken his or her bargaining position.
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raise prices because it faces no competition. To prevent such behavior, governments 
have introduced price regulation for natural monopolies. The UK has used revenue 
cap regulation based on the inflation rate (the retail price index, or RPI) and possible 
efficiency savings (X), using the formula RPI–X. The US instead regulates the rate 
of return for private monopolies, using a formula based on the efficient costs of 
production plus a market-determined rate of return on capital.
The outsourcing of water distribution shows the pitfalls of trying to outsource a 
public monopoly. In 2011, the European Commission issued a proposal to transfer 
the competencies of infrastructure development in traditionally publicly held sectors 
like water distribution, ports, and toll roads to private hands through the award of 
concession contracts for public–private partnerships. Massive protests greeted the 
proposal in Austria and Germany, where people feared that privatization would lead 
to higher prices, unjustified profits for the managing private companies, and lower 
water quality. The city of Munich, for example, takes great pride in its high water-
quality standards and strongly opposed the directive for these reasons. A way forward 
might be to allow municipalities to decide, on their own, which basic services are 
suitable for outsourcing and which should remain in public hands.
Privatization of the water supply system in developing countries shows a different, 
though ambiguous, picture. Privatization of water supplies in Colombia has led to 
improved water quality and better health outcomes [9]. Privatizations in Argentina 
and in Manila, the Philippines, are also generally considered success stories. In these 
countries, poor people who lacked access to good-quality water are now able to 
purchase it because for-profit companies have an incentive to sell water that customers 
are willing to buy. On the other hand, the attempt to introduce private participation 
in water supply failed in Bolivia, where massive price increases led the government to 
cancel the concession to the private company.
Public transportation
Public transportation systems are another area of outsourcing. An important 
mechanism to open the sector to competition is competitive tendering through 
auctioning. The idea is to “replace competition in the field by competition for the 
field” [10]. The higher the number of bidders, the more aggressively they should bid 
and the lower the final prices should be. Several design issues come into play. How 
many routes should be tendered simultaneously? Should contracts be auctioned for 
a single route or a group of routes? Bundling routes leads to benefits from shared 
fixed costs but can make it harder for smaller bidders to join. Finally, there is a risk 
of an inefficient outcome through collusion against the public buyer. Local public 
authorities need some discretionary means to minimize such behavior.
Both France and the UK have used auctions to introduce competition into urban 
public transportation, using very different approaches, with very different outcomes. 
The UK auctions (in London) were small and highly transparent, while the French 
auctions were bigger and less transparent [10]. Operating costs ended up being a lot 
lower in London, although costs started out at the same level. A comparison of the 
two systems concluded that improving competition depends crucially on the design 
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of the auction. The London design fosters a more competitive environment, especially 
when there are new private firms entering the bidding who compete more fiercely.
Political economy of the public–private choice
The patronage model of political decision-making claims that economic rents accrue 
to all political candidates independent of their standing if they increase in-house 
provision of public services. The model has been studied to explain the decisions 
on public-sector outsourcing by US counties. Studies have found strong evidence 
of political patronage: laws that restrict a county’s spending lead to increased 
outsourcing, while higher levels of unionization and the right to strike for public-
sector employees lead to more in-house production of services. Cities that are run by 
an appointed manager rather than an elected official have a lower level of in-house 
production [11].
A study of municipal governments in Sweden empirically tested the influence of political 
variables on the provision of public services [12]. Municipal governments’ color is 
measured by a left–right dummy variable (that is, a variable that is one in a case of 
an event, e.g. the ruling majority is left, and zero otherwise) according to the ruling 
majority, and the political preferences of the electorate are measured by the share of 
votes going to the right block. The analysis covered a period when municipalities were 
free to decide between public and private provision of preschools but had very limited 
influence over the provision of primary schools because of a national voucher system.
The results validate the theory of the citizen candidate—the idea that political 
candidates run for office primarily to be able to implement their own policy preferences. 
Consequently, where politicians can influence policies directly, as in the choice of 
public or private provision of preschools, politicians on the right would be expected 
to implement more outsourcing than those on the left. This is what the study found. 
It found no support for the patronage model.
LIMItatIonS anD GaPS
While studies tend to find that outsourcing and privatization have an overall ambiguous 
or positive effect on job creation in the medium to long run, as excess public-sector 
labor is freed for more productive uses, research has focused more on developing and 
transition economies. Less work has been done on developed countries, although the 
research that has been done finds similar results.
Another gap is in the sectoral analysis of the effects of outsourcing public services 
to private entities. It is unclear whether the privatization of government enterprises 
and the outsourcing of public services to private entities have the same employment 
effects in all affected sectors. Thus, it is too soon to say with certainty that public 
outsourcing will in general lead to positive employment effects. Another area needing 
research is whether the employment effects differ between the outsourcing of public 
services and the privatization of public enterprises.
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SuMMarY anD PoLICY aDvICE
As this examination of the possibilities for public-sector outsourcing for different 
market and competitive settings shows, it is not possible to give uniform policy advice 
on the outsourcing choice. Whether outsourcing an activity is optimal depends on 
whether it is a natural monopoly, how much scope there is for a hold-up problem to 
arise, whether cost reduction can be expected to result in a deterioration in service 
quality, and whether quality can be increased through competitive pressure. Political 
motivations and employment effects will also influence the decision on outsourcing. 
Outsourcing may reduce employment in the short run, but it also frees resources that 
can be reallocated to other activities over the longer run.
Some public goods and services can be successfully subjected to competition that 
improves quality and lowers costs. For example, introducing a voucher system can 
improve education outcomes. However, in the case of a natural monopoly, there is 
considerable risk that quality will deteriorate after outsourcing or privatization.
Networks like the public transportation system can be separated into components that 
are suitable for exposing to competition through auctions among private suppliers. 
The outcomes, however, depend on the design of the auction.
While most examinations of the decision on whether public or private provision of 
services is preferable have looked at the economic arguments, political economy 
considerations are also important. How much are politicians’ decisions influenced by 
the effect on a politician’s chances of being elected or re-elected?
In all discussion of the outsourcing of public production, it is essential to keep in 
mind the differing effects of outsourcing on the quality and costs of public goods 
and services. Realizing the potential benefits of outsourcing requires careful analysis 
to determine which activities would benefit from outsourcing, and how outsourcing 
should be implemented to provide the proper incentives for cost saving while 
maintaining or improving quality. In some cases, public competition can serve as an 
effective alternative or complement to outsourcing.
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